Animal metacognition is an active, growing research area, and one part of metacognition is flexible information-seeking behavior. In Roberts et al. (2009), pigeons failed an intuitive information-seeking task. They basically refused, despite multiple fostering experiments, to view a sample image before attempting to find its match. Roberts et al. concluded that pigeons' lack of an information-seeking capacity reflected their broader lack of metacognition. We report a striking species contrast to pigeons. Eight rhesus macaques and seven capuchin monkeys passed the Roberts et al. test of information seeking-often in their first testing session. Members of both primate species appreciated immediately the lack of information signaled by an occluded sample, and the need for an information-seeking response to manage the situation. In subsequent testing, macaques demonstrated flexible/varied forms of information management. Capuchins did not. The research findings bear on the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition across the vertebrates, and on the underlying psychological requirements for metacognitive and information-seeking performances.
Introduction
Human decision-making is often guided by our certainty or uncertainty about the accuracy of our own thought processes. We know when we do not have enough information to make an informed decision. We recognize that sometimes the right choice is not to choose, and we ask for further information instead. Humans' abilities to assess confidence and to manage uncertainty adaptively are collectively called metacognition. Metacognition can be informally defined as ''thinking about thinking,'' but it also refers to the monitoring of other, more basic ''first-order'' cognitive processes such as the processes of perceiving and remembering (Flavell, 1979) . Whenever humans reflect on what they know, monitor their thought processes, judge their confidence, or seek additional information, they demonstrate their metacognitive abilities (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Flavell, 1979; Koriat, 1993; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Nelson, 1992; Schwartz, 1994; Serra & Dunlosky, 2005) .
Metacognition is a highly sophisticated aspect of human cognition, intricately linked as it is to important aspects of mind, including cognitive control, self-awareness, and consciousness. Thus, it is an important question whether we share our capacity for metacognition with nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals). Evidence of such a shared capacity might bear on animals' self-awareness and consciousness, too, and it would also indicate the evolutionary foundations of metacognition in our own species. Not surprisingly, therefore, numerous research teams have explored this issue empirically (Beran, Smith, Redford, & Washburn, 2006; Call & Carpenter, 2001; Foote & Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Inman & Shettleworth, 1999; Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003; Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008; Washburn, Smith, & Shields, 2006) .
